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1963] RECENT DECISIONS II71 
INSURANCE-STATE REGULATION-SURPLUS LINE INSURANCE-Plaintiff, a 
New York corporation doing business in Texas, purchased insurance cov-
ering risks located in Texas from insurers not licensed to do business in 
that state. The entire insurance transaction was consummated outside 
Texas, and any adjustment for losses was to be made outside the state. 
Pursuant to a Texas statute,1 plaintiff was taxed an amount equal to five 
percent of its gross premiums. Plaintiff instituted the present suit in a 
state court in Texas to recover the tax, which had been paid under protest. 
The trial court's decision for plaintiff was affirmed by the court of civil 
appeals, and the Supreme Court of Texas denied an application for writ 
of error. On certiorari to the United States Supreme Court, held, affirmed, 
one Justice dissenting. Congress, in passing the McCarran Act,2 explicitly 
incorporated the limitations of prior Supreme Court decisions3 which had 
held that a state does not have the power to tax insurance contracts en-
tered into outside its jurisdiction, even though such contracts covered risks 
located within the state, and thus a de novo consideration of such decisions 
is inappropriate. State Bd. of Ins. v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 370 U.S. 451 
(1962). 
The principal case is illustrative of a troublesome area of state insur-
ance regulation, that involving surplus lip.e insurance. Historically, the func-
tion of surplus line insurance was to provide lines of insurance that were 
in excess of the lines, or amounts of a particular line, which could be 
absorbed by the insurance companies admitted to do business within a 
state. Today it has come to mean any insurance placed with insurance 
companies not admitted to do business in a particular state. Non-admitted 
insurers provide valuable services in addition to their historic function. 
First, non-admitted insurers are often responsible for the introduction of 
wholly new lines of insurance coverage in areas in which admitted com-
panies have shown little interest. Moreover, they can write insurance risk 
by risk, whereas their admitted counterparts, because of the restrictions 
imposed by state regulation and the belief that actuarial tables based on 
extensive sampling are necessary, are confined to writing only class insur-
ance. The ability to so individualize insurance coverage enables such 
insurers, through the use of non-standard forms, to tailor their policies to 
1 TEX. INS. CODE art. 21.!18, § 2(e) (Supp. 1962). 
2 59 Stat. !Ill (1945), 15 U.S.C. §§ 1011-15 (1958). 
s Connecticut Gen. Life Ins. Co. v. Johnson, !103 U.S. 77 (1938); St. Louis Cotton 
Compress Co. v. Arkansas, 260 U.S. !146 (1922); Allgeyer v. Louisiana, 165 U.S. 578 (1897). 
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the exact needs of the insured, and also to perform a valuable service in 
writing deductibles.4 Finally, the existence of surplus line insurers pro-
vides an escape from the rigid rate and form regulations imposed by 
states on admitted insurers. On the other hand, as many admitted insurers 
contend, the non-admitted insurer obtains an unfair competitive advan-
tage by not being subject to costly and burdensome state regulation and 
taxation. Moreover, since the non-admitted insurer is not generally re-
quired to disclose matters relating to its financial stability,5 less protection 
is offered to the public. 
There are three prevailing methods of writing insurance in the non-
admitted market:6 first, through local brokers licensed to deal with non-
admitted companies; second, through brokers in other states who are also 
licensed to deal in the non-admitted market; and third, in a few instances 
through direct application by the insured to the insurer. The state's right 
to tax the purchase of insurance through brokers operating in states other 
than the location of the risk was the primary issue in the principal case. 
In defining the permissible scope of state regulatory powers, the funda-
mental difficulty encountered is one of balancing an individual's interest 
in obtaining insurance wherever he wishes with the state's interest in the 
effective regulation and taxation of insurance contracts. This problem 
becomes most acute where a large corporation, doing a multi-state business, 
is involved; for such a concern can shop around until it finds the most 
favorable contract of insurance to suit its needs irrespective of the place 
where such contract is made, thereby circumventing legitimate state regu-
lation and taxation, and penalizing those insurance companies who, by 
virtue of the fact that they have submitted to state regulation, may find 
themselves unable to compete. In the principal case, the Texas statute 
represented an attempt to equalize burdens between companies subjected 
to the state regulation, and those not subject to the costs of such a program. 
Absent further congressional action, the decision would seem to forbid 
any state regulation or taxation of the direct buying of surplus line insur-
ance. Yet, the cases which the Court refused to examine,7 but nevertheless 
considered as controlling in delineating the scope of the state's taxing 
power,8 are seemingly open to question in the light of events subsequent 
4 See generally De Wolf, The Proposed Surplus Line Law: Constructive or Destruc-
tive?, 1961 INS. L.J. 259 (1961). 
5 An interesting account of financial instability is that concerning the Inland Empire 
Insurance Co. and the International Guaranty and Insurance Co. of Tangier, Morocco. 
Hearings on S. Res. 238 Before the Subcommittee on Antitrust and Monopoly of the 
Senate Committee on the Judiciary, 86th Cong., 2d Sess. pt. 10, at 5709 (1960). 
6 See address by Robert N. Gilmore, Jr., Panel Discussion of Zone 5 Meeting of 
the National Association of Insurance Commissioners, April 25, 1961. 
7 Cases cited in note 3 supra. 
s The congressional intent as expressed by the Court in the principal case reflects 
the explicit intent of the House; but the Senate, with the exception of Senator McCar-
ran's reference to the House intent, was silent as to its feelings regarding the inclusion 
of these cases within the framework of the McCarran Act. 
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to their decision, for these cases were decided on a very conceptualistic 
theory of the place of contract,9 and upon an interpretation of the due 
process clause which has since been rejected.10 In recent years the Court 
has gradually narrowed the holdings of these cases to their facts,11 and its 
hesitancy in the principal case to re-examine them gives rise to the infer-
ence that, were it not for the explicit congressional intent accompanying 
the enactment of the McCarran Act, a different result would have been 
reached. 
However, notwithstanding the fact that these decisions may be open 
to question, and that some legitimate state regulation or taxation may 
be circumvented, the result in the principal case is seemingly a desirable 
one; for the surplus line companies do serve useful purposes, and their ad-
vantage over admitted companies is not limited solely to a rate differential. 
The use of non-standard forms and the development of new lines of in-
surance are attributable to an initiative which is said to be generally lack-
ing in admitted companies. Moreover, there is little to be gained by penal-
izing those individuals who seek out forms of insurance not offered by 
the admitted companies on the ground that the cost of the regulatory 
system gives the non-admitted insurer an unfair competitive advantage. 
The real problem lies in securing for the public the advantages offered 
by surplus line companies while at the same time protecting those admitted 
insurance companies, who, by virtue of state regulation and taxation, are 
placed in an unfavorable competitive position. 
Several solutions to the problem of regulating the direct buying of 
surplus line insurance have been proposed. One possible solution is the 
promotion and adoption of surplus line broker laws throughout the coun-
try. Such laws might help eliminate the problems involved in those states12 
where the inefficacy of broker regulation gives non-admitted insurers an 
unfair advantage and denies the public adequate protection in their deal-
ings with financially unsound companies. Recognizing this need for uni-
formity in surplus line broker laws, the National Association of Insurance 
Commissioners has attempted to work out a solution. This body has pub-
lished a list of guiding principles for use in the revision of surplus line 
laws, which has been favorably received,13 and subsequently, a uniform non-
admitted insurance act,14 which is now in its fifth draft. There is no sign, 
9 See Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313, 316 (1943). 
10 See Lincoln Fed. Labor Union v. Northwestern Iron &: Metal Co., 335 U.S. 525, 
535 (1949). 
11 See, e.g., Hoopeston Canning Co. v. Cullen, 318 U.S. 313 (1943); Osborn v. Ozlin, 
310 U.S. 53 (1940). In the Hoopeston case the Court said that the Allgeyer case could 
not be controlling in those cases where the policy of the state was clear, the insured 
interest was located in the state, and there were many points of contact between the 
insurer and the property within the state. 318 U.S. at 319. 
12 Alabama, Delaware, Iowa, Minnesota and Wyoming have no surplus line laws. 
13 See address by Raymond A. Severin, The American Management Association 
Spring Insurance Conference, May 8, 1961. 
14 Hearings, supra note 5, at 6147. 
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however, that complete agreement as to its provisions will ensue. A satis-
factory uniform act, if enacted and enforced in all the states, could solve 
the present problems to a considerable extent. However, the uniform act 
as presently drafted applies only to residents of the enforcing state and 
has no reciprocal provisions, and thus its enactment would still leave 
largely unsolved the problems which accompany the purchase of insurance 
through a broker in another state. As an alternative to its proposal of a 
uniform act, the N.A.I.C. is considering the establishment of a "Central 
Non~Admitted Insurers Information Bureau"15-a permanent bureau which 
would collect and disseminate information concerning non-admitted in-
surers. On the basis of such information, such as notice of an insolvency, 
an insurance commissioner could take appropriate action to disqualify a 
company. The simplicity of the proposal and the absence of elaborate 
qualifying formalities appear to be its chief attributes. Another solution 
to the problem of effective regulation would be for the admitted companies 
to become more competitive by exercising their ingenuity in meeting new 
insurance needs while the legislatures revamped those particular regula-
tions which tend to stifle competition. One possibility would be for legis-
latures to enact premium limits above which no form or rate regulations 
would exist, thereby freeing admitted insurers from the rigid policy regu-
lations which often prevent them from competing with the surplus line 
companies. As a result of an elimination of much of the need for resorting 
to the non-admitted market, survival would become more difficult, in light 
of increased competition and decreased demand, for financially unsound 
non-admitted companies. 
A final approach would be federal intervention in the field of insurance 
regulation. Although this solution is generally not favored either by the 
states or by the insurers,16 it is being seriously contemplated17 because 
of the apparent inability of the states to protect consumers effectively from 
the evils attending the operation of the non-admitted insurer, and also 
because many of the surplus line companies are alien18 and hence more 
properly a subject of federal regulation. The critical question is one of 
determining what kind of federal intervention is necessary to solve the 
surplus line problem. First, it seems improbable that the federal govern-
ment would take over the regulation of all insurance activity in light of 
the complicated state machinery which has existed for years in this area. 
It would be possible merely to assume the regulation of surplus line insur-
ance, although the imposition of additional federal requirements would 
certainly complicate the activities of insurance brokers and companies. 
15 See The National Underwriter, June 22, 1962, p. 1, col. 1; id., April 6, 1962, p. 1, 
col. 4. 
16 See address by Julius S. Wikler, Zone 2 Meeting of the National Association of 
Insurance Commissioners, April 26, 1961. 
17 See address by Donald P. McHugh, American Society of Insurance Management, 
May 8, 1961. 
1s Ibid. 
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Secondly, Congress could amend the McCarran Act to provide explicitly 
that the states could regulate or tax insurance transactions where the risk 
is within the state, notwithstanding the fact that all other events and con-
tacts take place outside the state. However, since the old cases prohibiting 
such state action19 on due process grounds have never been overruled, 
constitutional limitations might be deemed to prevent Congress from 
making such an affirmative grant to the states. Indeed, some doubt exists 
as to whether the Court in the principal case is merely saying that Con-
gress incorporated the due process limitations of these cases into the Mc-
Carran Act and hence is affirming the old view of economic due process, 
or that Congress under the commerce clause merely used these cases 
to delineate the boundaries of permissible state regulation and taxation. 
The refusal of the Court to re-examine de novo the soundness of these 
decisions, and Senator McCarran's conclusion, after reading the House 
report incorporating these decisions, that "we give to the States no more 
powers than those they previously had, and we take none from them,"20 
gives strong support to the view that Congress used these cases merely as 
an aid in establishing the limits of the regulatory powers granted to the 
states by Congress and did not in any way intend to place due process 
restrictions on the states in their regulation and taxation of insurance 
activities. Finally, Congress might regulate only those alien insurance 
companies doing an interstate business, though such an approach would 
leave unsolved identical problems with respect to domestic surplus line 
companies. 
The best answer to the problem seemingly lies in some form of state 
regulation; but it also seems clear that, if the continuing regulation of 
insurance is to remain with the states, they need to act promptly. The 
states must be aware that non-admitted insurance companies play an im-
portant role in the insurance market, and that competition from the non-
admitted segment should not be needlessly restricted. At the same time, 
it is imperative that adequate safeguards be provided to protect the con-
sumers from financially unsound companies without damaging the vitality 
of the non-admitted market. 
10 Cases cited in note 3 supra. 
20 91 CONG. REC. 1442 (1945). 
James C. Lockwood, S.Ed. 
